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Abstract 
Often we observe that the third world countries always top the corruption indices compare to the developed West. 
This incident naturally leads to the question of why - Is it because the third world countries are significantly 
more corrupt than the developed countries? Or, is there any other reason behind this issue?--these are the 
questions that are explored in this article. To be more specific, this article critically explores contemporary 
arguments regarding inherent issues of corruption and various aspects of measurement techniques of corruption 
indices (e.g. definition issue, identification problem, clandestine nature of corruption, perceptual problem, 
validity and reliability of corruption data). Thus, by examining the innate complex nature of corruption, the 
article argue that, in many cases, in comparison to the developed West, corruption of developing nations may not 
be as deep as the corruption indices, which are also contested, accuse. In addition, the article emphasizes that the 
corruption issue is specifically targeted towards the third world countries more so than the developed countries. 
Keywords: corruption, governance, corruption indices, corruption measurement 
 
1. Introduction 
Many academicians, researchers and organizations have tried to develop the definition for corruption over time 
but still there are conceptual and political debates persist over these definitions (Johnston, 1996). It is noticeable 
that a major focus has been given only to public sector to define corruption.  The widely accepted definition, 
developed by the World Bank, defines corruption as ‘the abuse of public power for private benefit’ (Tanzi, 
1998:564).  But this is not the case in reality as corruption actually persists in both private and public sectors. In 
such case, definition given by Transparency International (TI) becomes more acceptable because TI defines 
corruption as ‘the misuse of entrusted power for private gain’ (Knack, 2007:255). This is a more neutral 
definition though there is a question as to whether corruption is confined to a question of personal gain. There is 
plenty of evidence where corruption is justified on the ground of national interests1. Thus we have defined 
corruption as— 
Abuse of public or private power for the personal gain or for the greater interest of the nation 
To get a broader picture, some advocate emphasizing the connection between the idea of corruption and the 
political processes (Johnston 1996, Shleifer & Vishny 1993). Political scientists define corruption as a ‘function 
of the lack of durable political institutions and political competition, and a weak and undeveloped civil society’ 
(Robinson, 2002:3). 
In the following section, the conceptual arguments of corruption are examined in relation to East West 
dichotomy. 
 
2. Corruption: East Vs West 
Apparently the definition suggested by the political scientists (discussed above) seems right if we apply this 
definition with the corruption issues of the developing countries. But ironically this definition may seem wrong 
once we explore the corruptions of the developed nations which have higher level of political stability and very 
sophisticated civil society. Generally, we observe that the corruption issue is specifically targeted towards the 
third world countries more so than the developed countries. But closer examinations of various issues of the 
developed countries also show that the corruption has become an important factor for the developed nations as 
well. We can observe a series of reported2 or unreported corruption in developed nations. The corruption issue of 
the developed nations is not intensified to general people the way it makes major news for the developing 
countries. This may be because corruption happens so blatantly in the developing nations that it is largely 
publicized in the media whereas in the West, the corruption remains invisible due to sophisticated techniques 
(Khera, 2001) and often they are given camouflaging terms for political reasons. 
But various incidents (e.g. global financial crisis) often reveal some major aspects of corruption. For example, 
corporate governance issues in the financial sector can shed light on this matter; Mr. Madoff’s £33 billion fraud 
                                                           
1 Mostly in international defence contracts. The evidences are discussed later in this section. 
2 E.g. It is reported by Le Monde in March 17, 1995, that French companies paid FF10 billion to foreign 
companies in 1994; World Business of March 4, 1996, reported that the bribes paid abroad by German 
companies had been estimated to exceed US$ 3 billion a year. (Tanzi, 1998:563). 
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case in 2008 is one of the biggest financial scandals in the stock market history (BBC, 2008). The collapse of the 
stock markets around the world, ‘triggered by the fall of Lehman Brothers, the Wall Street bank, which proved to 
be Mr Madoff’s unravelling’ (Times, 2008). In general, these types of ‘Corporate Fraud 1’ causes British 
businesses £72 billion a year, on an average (Guardian, 2005) and ‘the total fraud/abuse loss to U.S. 
organizations is over $400 billion annually’ (Khera, 2001:32); that is ‘an average organization loses $9 per day 
per employee to fraud’ in USA (Khera, 2001:32). Irrespective of the increasing nature of corporate fraud in the 
West, it is not recognized as the ‘corruption of West’ in such way. 
On the other hand, the Multinational Corporations (MNCs) make questionable payments to the foreign officials 
to enter into the new markets or to get preferential business supports in the foreign countries (Hamra, 2000). It is 
true that the politicians of the developing nations demand large amount of bribe from the foreign companies as 
they see public business dealings as profit making opportunities, but the MNCs also comply with these 
questionable payments to win the government contracts (Hamra, 2000). Moreover, the large MNCs frequently 
violate business ethics for their corporate benefits. For example, International Baby Food Action Network has 
found Nestle violating the World Health Organization’s Code for selling baby formula in over 80 countries 
(Khera, 2001). 
The government of the developed nations are also involved in many corruptive acts. They fight against each 
other to get international contracts where bribery is a common strategy they use to outperform one another in this 
competition 2 . The volume of bribe involved in these sorts of deals is enormous. Such as, BAE (British 
Aerospace, the arms company) was alleged of paying £1billion to Saudi prince, Prince Bandar, ‘in connection 
with Britain’s biggest ever weapons contract’ (£43billion Al-Yamamah arms deal) in June 2007 (Guardian, 
2007). The insider legal source revealed that BAE paid the bribe ‘with the knowledge and authorization of 
Ministry of Defence officials under the Blair government and its predecessors’ (Guardian, 2007). The case was 
investigated by the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) but the investigation was halted by the attorney general, Lord 
Goldsmith, on the ground of national interest. 
Politicians or officials or international institutions of the developed nations often help the corrupt politicians of 
the developing nations to fulfil their objectives if that is beneficial for them as well. Highly corrupt leaders of 
developing countries often transfer their illegal earnings to the financial centres of the developed countries with 
their cooperation. Such as, Marcos in the Philippines or Abacha in Nigeria transferred their looted proceeds in 
the safe havens of developed countries (Kaufmann, 2008). Moreover, the top leaders/politicians of the developed 
countries can also be found of guilty of corruption charges for their personal benefit. For example, the former 
Italian Prime Minister, Berlusconi, was accused of paying £315,000 to a corporate lawyer, Mr. Mills, to withheld 
some damaging information about Berlusconi in two trials in 1990s (The Independent, 2006). 
The above mentioned incidents are sometimes termed as ‘organized crime3’. The concept of organized crime is 
not new, for a long period of time there are several criminal organizations (Italian Mafia, South American drug 
curtails, Chinese Triads, Japanese Yakuza, US Cosa Nostra) operating globally. These organizations act as a 
separate independent entity beside state and many of their characteristics are similar to formal state; however 
their activities4 are declared as illegal and criminal by the state (Strange, 1997). Several examples of organized 
crime can be seen in Russia where crucial relationship can be found between the government and the criminal 
organizations that undermine the rule of law and democracy (Write, 2006)5. Russian Interior Ministry (MVD) 
estimated that the accumulated criminal capital in Russia is about 10 to 10.5 billion USD by March 1996 (EU, 
1998). In Italy, Giulio Andreotti, the seven-time prime minister, ‘has twice been deprived of his parliamentary 
                                                           
1 E.g. corporate fraud can be insider trading, overstating profits, establishing complex accounting schemes that 
involve siphoning money into offshore accounts, money laundering and elaborate cover-ups by senior managers 
designed to protect dealers who trade in derivatives or equities etc. 
2 E.g. A German shipbuilding corporation made $3million bribe to South African officials to win a major defence 
contract. (Bönisch G. and Dettmer M., 2007). E.g. A possible bribery charges involving a $50 million contract to 
renovate the headquarters of a Geneva-based United Nations agency, according to government documents and 
Swiss and American officials. (Miller J., 2005). 
 
3 United Nations have given a universal definition of organized crime in 1976. According to UN, organized 
crime ‘is understood to be the large scale and complex criminal activity carried on by groups of persons, 
however loosely or tightly organized, for the enrichment of those participating and at the expense of the 
community and its members’. (Write, 2006:8). 
4  i.e. Arms dealing, Counterfeiting, Drug Trafficking, Fraud and Corporate Crime, Money Laundering, 
Smuggling, Marine Piracy, Labour Racketeering etc. (Write, 2006:49). 
5 Russian Authority estimated in 1994 that there are roughly 5,700 criminal gangs that employ approximately 3 
million workers, whose output of criminal production is at the level equivalent to 35% of Russian GDP (EU, 
1998:48). 
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immunity for charges of collaboration with the Mafia’ (Write, 2006:53). 
From another strand, the West always accuses the developing nations for using child labour in the industrial 
sectors, especially in the apparel sectors1. But this is also true for the developed nations; statistics show that ‘in 
an average week, more than 4 million 12-17 year olds are employed in the U.S.’ (Khera, 2001:33). Moreover, 
about 290,000 children who unlawfully work in the U.S. industries are ‘subjected to such dangers as pesticides, 
construction site accidents, sharp implements, and more’ (Khera, 2001:33). But surprisingly the child labour 
issue is perceived to happen only in developing nations. 
The above discussion reflects clearly the fact that the nature of corruption is vast and not only confined to third 
world countries though the West may have some biases or stereotyping over the developing nations about this 
issue. We should not take any myopic view while conceptualizing the corruption concept. Furthermore, we 
should not make any comment about who is more corrupt than whom between developed and developing nations, 
without applying any proper comparison tool. 
In the following section we will critically analyze the methodologies followed by various corruption 
measurement tools. 
 
3. Methods: Critical Analysis of Corruption Indices 
The complexities of the nature of corruption, contextual issues and the normative nature of the concept of 
corruption make it difficult to develop universal measurement techniques for it. Still, a number of corruption 
measurement techniques have been developed and are largely being used to measure corruption. All these 
measurement techniques are developed using quantitative approach where the common objective is to measure 
corruption and its extent with numbers so that longitudinal analysis and cross-country comparability is possible. 
Basically, all the indicators/indices follow three ways to gather information to construct them; these are (a) 
perceptual views and experiences of stakeholders 2  (usually follows survey method), (b) various countries’ 
institutional profiles3; and (c) audit reports of various projects (Urra, 2007). Though these indicators are widely 
used these days for anti-corruption policy formulation or for other policy issues, the validity or reliability of 
these techniques needs closer investigations of their inherent purposes and methodologies. 
3.1 Definition Problem 
This is the most basic problem of measuring corruption. This issue already have been discussed in the first 
section that there could not be any universal definition of corruption; and for that, development of any single 
standardized measurement technique is difficult. Though several corruption indicators exist, each of them differs 
in their own way of defining corruption and how they intend to measure it. Thus, for these indicators, it is 
important to be transparent about their definition, purpose and methodology they follow. 
3.2 Identification Issue: Normative Nature of Corruption 
Measurement of corruption starts with the assumption that there is finite number of different corruptive activities 
exists that research can count (Gallup, 1999). But, there can be infinite ways of identifying various acts as 
corruptive acts itself is subject to normative issue. Therefore, how or who will judge an act as corruptive one is 
of serious concern. Any effort to classify behaviours may not be satisfactory because of the normative nature of 
the concept of corruption (Johnston, 2004). Actually, there is no single easy way to solve this problem. 
3.3 Clandestine Nature of Corruption 
As the act of corruption is something to hide, so it is difficult to extract the actual information about a corruptive 
incidence. Even sometimes it happens that the ‘officials charged with control are themselves compromised’; thus 
it becomes even more difficult to measure such corruption (Johnston, 2000:4). In other cases, ‘where corrupt 
officials and their clients operate with impunity, informants and prying journalists might be silenced by 
intimidation’ (Johnston, 2000:18). Moreover, the stakeholders of a corruptive act (i.e. government officials who 
get the share of a bribe or business people who enjoys unfair benefit) will hide the true picture because of selfish 
reason. 
3.4 Perceptual Problem 
Perceptions are subject to social/individual norms, values and contextual experiences. Peoples’ perception can 
vary to a greater extent based on various countries’ or societies’ inherent value system. Judgement of corruption 
                                                           
1 The Department of Labor's 1994 international child labor study, By the Sweat and Toil of Children (Volume I): 
The Use of Child Labor in U.S. Manufactured and Mined Imports, catalogued existing information on child 
labor in the garment industries of Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Lesotho, Morocco, 
the Philippines, Portugal and Thailand. The report states that children were involved in the production of 
garments for export to the United States. (U.S. Department of Labor, 2008). 
2  Businesses, public officials, international actors (NGOs and multilateral agencies), and individuals. (Urra, 
2007). 
3 Institutional profile focusing on procurement practices, administrative framework, budget management etc. 
where there is scope for corruption. (Urra, 2007). 
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of an alleged act depends on the context and value system of that society. Such as, the likelihood of perceiving a 
gift giving habit as corruptive act in Russia and in Denmark would be different (Gallup, 1999). Indices that are 
based on perceptual measurement of corruption are hard to use as cross-country comparison of corruption for 
this perceptual issue. Moreover, perceptual measurement can vary over time as people’ perception always 
changes due to changes in the value system. Thus, these issues should be considered while developing perceptual 
based indicators. 
3.5 Validity 
Validity means whether the data can actually measure what we intend to measure (Babbie, 2004). If the concept 
of corruption were clearly identified then the most important part would be to collect appropriate data to measure 
it. Irrespective of the definitional argument of corruption, the widely accepted Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is constructed principally on the basis of the perceptual data of international 
business experts; but it excludes households and small informal business sectors. Some criticize that this ‘expert 
evaluations’ of CPI are ‘severely biased’ due to the nature of the respondent group who are all international 
business experts (Gallup, 1999). Here the nature of the group means this group is a fairly closed group having 
little or no idea about local customs and language, and they are all businessman (Gallup, 1999). Thus, it is highly 
unlikely that these people can reflect the experiences of informal business sectors, women or poor (Jones, 2007). 
In support with this view, a study conducted by Razafindrakoto and Roubaud found that the CPI (contributed by 
the experts) is ‘overestimated four or fivefold the extent to which households in some francophone African 
countries experienced corruption’ (Jones, 2007:1). Thereby, the validity issue of CPI is questionable. It is of 
utmost concern now that whether the CPI can really reflect the overall corruption level of a country or not. 
3.6 Reliability 
Reliability means generating same results if a technique is repeatedly applied to the same object (Babbie, 2004). 
If we analyse the reliability of CPI, it is commendable.  The statistical correlation analysis shows that CPI’s 
results are broadly consistent over one year to the next (Johnston, 2000). Transparency International claims that 
CPI ‘is the most statistically robust means of measuring perceptions of corruption’ (Lambsdorff, 1998:1). But the 
results are too strong or show too higher consistency1 in some particular cases and that is not expected in reality. 
Too consistent result is an issue because corruption is supposed to change over time and a reliable result should 
also reflect these changes in their results. Thus a reliable corruption indicator should reflect the 
expected/necessary changes as well. But even if the result changes it would be difficult to evaluate its accuracy 
because a mere change in result would not tell us anything about the changes in ‘real’ level of corruption 
(Johnston, 2000). 
3.7 Precision 
The preciseness of the measurement concerns the degree of fineness of the attributes that compose a variable 
(Babbie, 2004). The precision of various corruption indices is difficult to evaluate because there is lack of 
standard frame of reference or standardized value in this area. There is also a lack of understanding about what 
scale should be used in corruption measurement or how the distribution of the observations should be distributed 
(Johnston, 2000). Often CPI data are considered as ratio data but differences between two scores does not 
necessarily means absolute difference (Johnston, 2000); i.e. let two countries, A & B, having CPI scores 4 and 2 
accordingly. Hence, this result does not mean that country ‘A’ is twice as corrupt than country ‘B’. Rather CPI 
data can be considered as ordinal data, that is, with the help of former example we can say that country ‘A’ is 
more corrupt than country ‘B’; but we cannot make any comment about the extent of corruptions or even the 
dimensions of corruptions of these countries. 
3.8 Weighting of Aggregated Indices 
Usually aggregated indices generate data from more than one methods/sources and thus weight them according 
to certain justification and thus construct the composite indices (i.e. CPI, BEEPS, World Governance Indictors 
etc.). Two of the simple weighting approaches that CPI considers are ‘time’ and ‘professionalism and reliability’ 
factors. In ‘time’ factor, more weights are given to recent data and lower weights are given to older data 
(Lambsdorff, 1998). But this may not be a very good way of weighting different sources of data, as the ‘quality’ 
of data is ignored in this approach; it does not necessarily mean that older data are always less relevant or even 
lower in quality than the recent data. In the second approach, ‘professionalism and reliability’ factor, different 
sources are categorized according to various levels of ‘professionalism and reliability’ and thus higher weights 
are given to higher ranked sources/data and lower weights given to lower ranked sources/data (Lambsdorff, 
1998). Then again, there is a problem with such approach, that is how or who to judge the degree of 
‘professionalism and reliability’ of various sources/data. These examples show that weighting issues are crucial 
to develop composite or aggregated indices. 
                                                           
1 The coefficient is 0.94 between 1995 and 1999 scores which might be too strong for corruption measurement. 
(Johnston, 2000:13). 
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3.9 Subjective Vs Objective Approaches 
Most of the indices are subjective indicators that measure basically the ‘perception’ of corruption rather than 
actual level of corruption. A certain level of error would be associated with any subjective measurement 
technique due to attitudinal bias, contextual bias, or perceptual differences of the respondents. Due to these 
problems, constant pressure is building up on focusing on ‘hard objective data’ than ‘soft perception’ data (Urra, 
2007). Though objective indicators can generate relatively accurate results but there is scarcity of pure objective 
measurement techniques in corruption measurement because of lack of factual information in this area due to 
sensitive/clandestine nature of corruption. Thus efforts are shifting toward developing subjective indices backed 
up by hard evidences/documentations of the data. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The above discussion clearly shows that an area as complex as corruption is difficult to measure in an objective 
way. However, we widely observe that particular interest groups try to measure corruption in their own 
justifiable way. We should be morally conscious while producing any corruption indices which itself is 
contestable. Global recognition of highly corrupted countries based on controversial methods can demean their 
images to the rest of the world. It is a question whether developing countries (e.g. Bangladesh) could top over 
some developed countries (e.g. USA or Britain) in corruption ranking if the corruptions were measured in 
absolute monetary terms1 (objective measurement) instead of perceptual measurement techniques; however all 
the measurement techniques are perceptual in nature and hence the results are confined only to particular 
subjective perspectives. 
Here, the intention is not to conclude that developing countries are free of corruption, rather the issue would be 
not to blame only the third world countries as being corrupt as the developed countries are equally (or even more) 
corrupted, but they are in disguise. Actually corruption takes different form in different parts of the world and we 
need to have a standardized transparent method to identify and classify them. We hope that the issues that have 
mentioned in this paper should be addressed by various corruption measurement bodies in future and modify 
their methodologies in measuring corruption. 
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